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ISSN 1109-6691 Editorial 
  The South-Eastern European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) is a 
community of financial historians, economists and statisticians, established in April 
2006 at the initiation of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank of Greece. Its 
objective is to spread knowledge on the economic history of the region in the context 
of European experience with a specific focus on financial, monetary and banking 
history. The First and the Second Annual Conferences were held in Sofia (BNB) in 
2006 and in Vienna (OeNB) in 2007. Additionally, the SEEMHN Data Collection 
Task Force aims at establishing a historical data base with 19
th and 20
th century 
financial and monetary data for countries in the region. A set of data has already been 
published as an annex to the 2007 conference proceedings, released by the OeNB 
(2008, Workshops, no 13). 
On 13-14 March 2008, the Third Annual Conference was held in Athens, 
hosted by the Bank of Greece. The conference was dedicated to Banking and Finance 
in South-Eastern Europe: Lessons of Historical Experience. It was attended by 
representatives of the Albanian, Austrian, Belgian, Bulgarian, German, Greek, 
Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Turkish central banks, as well as participants from a 
number of universities and research institutions. Professor Michael Bordo delivered 
the key note speech on Growing up to Financial Stability. The participants presented, 
reviewed and assessed the experience of SE Europe with financial development, 
banking and central banking from a comparative and historical perspective. 
The 4
th Annual SEEMHN Conference will be hosted by the National Serbian 
Bank on 27
th March 2009 in Belgrade. The topic of the Conference will be Economic 
and Financial Stability in SE Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
  The papers presented at the 2008 SEEMHN Conference are being made 
available to a wider audience in the Working Paper Series of the Bank of Greece. 
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Sovereign bonds are usually priced under the assumption that only the sovereign 
issuer may be responsible of their repayment. In some cases however, bondholders 
may legitimately expect to be repaid by more than one agent. For example, when a 
country breaks-up, successor states may agree to recognize their responsibility for part 
of the debt. Other extreme events, such as repudiations, may lead (and have led) 
bondholders to consider several bailout candidates at the same point in time. This 
paper first discusses the theoretical financial implications stemming from an 
infrequent and challenging situation, namely the existence of multiple potential 
payers. Then, through a historical precedent, the 1918 Russian repudiation, the paper 
confirms that the existence of multiple potential payers has a diversification effect 
which lowers the volatility of the bond price and increases its value. These results are 
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1.  Introduction  
Sovereign bonds are unique financial assets because of the nature of their 
issuers. In the absence of an international recognized body acting as a court, 
bondholders have almost no way to enforce payment on a defaulting country. 
Nonetheless, countries keep on issuing large amount of debts, bondholders subscribe 
these and defaults remain, on average, more the exception than the rule. Researchers 
have therefore attempted to understand the incentives for investors to still subscribe 
such bonds (Eaton et Fernandez, 1995), the causes of default but also countries’ 
motivations to repay their debts. 
According to Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig (2003) the main factors 
leading to default are macroeconomic imbalances and instability, high external debt 
ratios, illiquidity or refinancing risks as well as policy uncertainty. Eichengreen, 
Haussman, and Panizza (2003) stress the importance of the “original sin”, i.e. the 
incapacity to borrow in its own currency. Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) 
suggest that countries could become “debt intolerant”. They observe that some 
countries with very low debt ratios still end up defaulting whereas others manage to 
fulfill their obligations despite huge debt ratios. For some “serial defaulters” 
countries, defaults have almost become a way of living. The literature on motivations 
to repay identifies several risks associated to default: reputation loss (Borchard and 
Wynne, 1951; Fishlow 1985, Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981), penalties or commercial 
retaliations (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Rose, 2005; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2004), 
asset seizure and military intervention (Fishlow, 1985; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 
2005).  
When defaults occur bondholders may always hope to get bailed out by an 
International Financial Institution or, but this has proved less frequent, by their own 
government. Eventually, bondholders may hope to get reimbursed by a series of states 
when an empire (or a country) breaks up. Following the break-up of the Ottoman 
Empire protracted negotiations started regarding the fate of its debts. Eventually, 
successor states were each assigned a part of this debt in the framework of the 
Lausanne Treaty (1924). Turkey's share amounted to 65%, Greece's to 9%, Syria and 
Lebanon inherited 8%, Iraq 5%, Yugoslavia 4%, Palestine 3%, the remaining part 
being divided between Bulgaria, Albania, Hedjaz, Yemen, Transjordania, Italy,   8
Nedjd, Maan and Assyria (Borchard and Wynne, 1951). These elements raise two 
questions: what is the impact of bailout expectations on default probabilities and how 
does the existence of multiple potential payers affect sovereign bond prices? The first 
question is nowadays the subject of intense debates and has led to numerous 
publications. These will be shortly reviewed in the next section. The second one has, 
to our knowledge, never been addressed. However, one wonders how the holder of an 
Ottoman bond should have reacted in the early 1920's. Was the new repartition of the 
debt among states which would now be considered as having highly different ratings a 
good or a bad news? 
The impact of international official rescues following successive debt 
problems in a number of developing countries is the subject of an important number 
of research papers. Typically, International Monetary Fund’s bailouts are known to be 
plagued by moral hazard both for creditors and debtor countries. Whereas IMF 
lending in crisis situations might encourage investors to excessive risk-taking 
practices, they can also push sovereign debtors to implement imprudent policies. 
Empirical evidence on IMF interventions has not managed to bring a clear-cut answer 
to these questions. Kamin (2004) and Brealey and Kaplanis (2004) find no clear 
impact of IMF interventions on debt values. On the other hand, another group of 
research papers (see for instance Dell’Ariccia et al., 2006 among others) analyzes the 
effects of bailout expectations on sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets and 
point out the existence of “investor moral hazard”. Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2005) 
focus on the conditions under which official crisis lending does not have any adverse 
incentive effects (the “Mussa theorem”). Basically they suggest that IMF lending at an 
actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximization of the welfare of 
their taxpayers contribute to avoid any moral hazard. By pointing out the necessary 
conditions under which IMF interventions do not induce inefficiencies, their paper 
contributes to establishing potential channels through which moral hazard could in 
fact appear in practice. Besides IFIs interventions governments have sometimes 
accepted to bailout their nationals who were holding sovereign bonds in default. 
Historically, the degree of intervention has widely varied from one country to the 
other, with Great-Britain showing a great reluctance to bail out their debt holders 
whereas France or Germany were more willing to help them out (Eichengreen and 
Portes, 1989).    9
Historical evidence shows that in some specific cases, notably country break up or 
repudiations, bondholders could legitimately hope to get reimbursed by more than one 
actor. The existence of multiple potential payers is highly infrequent and has therefore 
never been analyzed in depth. This paper proceeds as follows. The next section 
presents a theoretical model based on modern finance portfolio theory. Notably, it 
stresses that when multiple potential payers exist, investors may be considered as 
holding portfolios of negatively correlated assets. A high bailout probability from one 
potential payer - low probability of non reimbursement - is associated with low 
bailout probabilities from the other potential payers. The third section describes one of 
the most salient examples of multiple bailout expectations: the repudiation of Russian 
bonds by the Bolsheviks in 1918. The data and empirical results are presented in 
section 4 which also provides a comparison with a standard case of bonds in default, 
with a single payer. 
 
2.  Multiple potential payers and bonds portfolio 
Several methods may be used to compute sovereign bond prices. A standard 
model takes into account the expected cash flows and discounts them with an interest 
rate reflecting the bond risk. An alternative is to discount the cash flows at a risk free 
rate and then to add in a factor controlling for default probabilities and recovery value 
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c = nominal coupon rate 
t t t pDebtor pDebtor p − = −1   =  adjusted risk-neutral probability of default 
during the specific date t-1 to date t   10
t f = risk free present value discount factor 
R = recovery value paid immediately after default  
 
As underlined by Cumby and Pastine (2001), this default probability must be 
considered more as a synthetic measure of the debtor’s credit quality rather than as a 
true (actuarial) default probability. Indeed, interpreting these estimates as true default 
probabilities requires the implicit assumption that agents are risk neutral and failing to 
account for risk aversion may generate overestimations of implied default rates. 
The underlying hypothesis is that default probabilities computed at a given 
date remain constant for all the future cash flows following that date. Considering the 
date t term risk-neutral probability rate as  t ρ , then, the probability of a payment at a 
future date t becomes 
 
t
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If there is not bailout expectation and if one further assumes a zero recovery value
1, 
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If there is a default with one single payer, equation (4) describes the bond value as 
only depending upon implicit risk neutral default probabilities and the risk free 
discounted cash flow. In a more generic form, each future cash flow generated by the 
bond is a sum of two components, i.e.  
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Suppose now that another agent may be perceived as a potential candidate for 
the reimbursement. Then, equation (4) must be rewritten as 
 
                                                 
1 This assumption may also overstate true default probabilities.   11
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where pIFI is the probability of reimbursement from this external agent. In this case, 
one assumes that the bailout probability is conditional on default.  If one considers the 
case of a default with multiple payers
, then, the two components of each future cash 
flow become pOthers pDebtor A pDebtor A * ) 1 ( * * − + .  pOthers measures the 
probability of other potential payers substituting the original debtor and paying the 
cash flow. 
The probability of the debtor continuing to provide the debt service, i.e. 
pDebtor, is not the same in the two situations, i.e. single versus multiple potential 
payers. Namely, whenever there is a bailout opportunity the debtor has less incentive 
to pay the whole amount due, i.e. A, as there is potentially an institution/a government 
that may support part of his debt service. This is typically the argument put forward 
by the advocates of the moral hazard theory in the international financial lending 
policy of the IMF.  
In our case, we may write the following relationship between the probabilities 
of potential repayment: 
 
payers multiple payer gle pDebtor pDebtor _ _ sin ≥      (6) 
 
However, if we detail the content of a future cash flow expected by bondholders when 
there is bailout with two potential payers excluding the original debtor, i.e. IFI1 and 
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Each future cash flow generated by such a bond may then be seen as the value of a 3-
asset portfolio of amounts equal to pDebtor A* ,  1 * ) 1 ( * pIFI pDebtor A −  and 
2 1 * ) 1 ( * ) 1 ( * pIFI pIFI pDebtor A − −  respectively. Moreover, whenever one 
probability increases, the two others decrease and vice-versa. This portfolio may thus 
be considered as being composed by three negatively correlated assets. As modern 
portfolio theory states, diversification, even naïve,  improves the risk-return 
characteristics of any group of assets as a whole with respect to each of them 
individually. The result is even stronger if the composing assets are negatively 
correlated. Hence, the higher the number of such potential assets representing 
potential parts of the debt service to be supported by different payers is, the higher the 
expected future cash flow. Moreover, as an additional result of diversification, the 
higher the number of such “fictitious” assets, the lower the risk, i.e. the lower the 
volatility. 
In other terms, the number of probabilities included in pOthers (and their 
level) plays a crucial role in the amount of each expected future cash flow and by 
consequent, in the bond value and in its volatility. One could even imagine that 
whenever the number of expected potential payers substituting the initial debtor 
becomes important, the effects of diversification become more significant and hence 
the value of a future expected cash flow generated by a bond in the case of multiple 
payers may become equal or even superior to that expected by bondholders with only 
one debtor. Hence, for a number of multiple potential payers large enough, one could 
imagine the following inequality: 
 
payers multiple payer gle flow Cash flow Cash _ _ sin _ _ ≤      (8) 
 
As a consequence, as bond prices are sums of discounted future cash flows, the same 
inequality may be written for the bond prices, i.e. 
 
  payers multiple payer gle V V _ 0 _ sin 0 ≤        (9) 
 
where the value of a repudiated bond with two potential payers has the following form   13
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It is then obvious that the bond value at each moment in time can be considered as the 
value of a portfolio composed by as many assets as the number of potential payers. 
Diversification then contributes to compensate the specific (idiosyncratic) risks 
associated to each individual asset and to enhance the total risk-return trade off. 
Under the set of assumptions presented above, the presence of multiple 
potential bailouts should increase the bond price value and decrease their risk. 
Theoretically, the prices of bonds with multiple payers should, in some extreme cases, 
stay at a higher level compared to bonds with a single potential payer while their 
volatility should be lower. Several elements must however be stressed: first, the 
model assumes that recovery value is equal to zero. This is hardly the case in reality. 
Second, and as mentioned earlier, cases of multiple potential payers are rare in reality. 
Third, the model assumes that the bailout will provide a cash flow equal to the whole 
amount of the discounted cash flow. This is also unlikely. Eventually, negative 
correlations assume that there is no cooperation among the different potential bailout 
agents. In view of these limitations, it is no wonder that the implication of multiple 
potential bailouts goes unnoticed and has almost no effect on bond prices.  In order to 
determine this impact, one would need a series of potential payers perceived as 
credibly committed by bondholders to view any impact on the price itself. This is 
exactly the case of the repudiation by the Bolsheviks of Russian bonds issued under 
the Tsarist regime, which we describe and analyze in the next section. 
 
3. The Russian repudiation and its multiple payers 
The Bolshevik repudiation has been one of the most dramatic events in modern 
financial history. In France alone, approximately 12 billions of French francs, 
representing close to 4.5% of French wealth had been invested in these bonds, mainly 
for political reasons. A large literature has been devoted to these bonds (Girault, 1973) 
and their potential reimbursement (Freymond, 1996). More recently, Oosterlinck   14
(2003) and Landon-Lane and Oosterlinck (2006) have shown that following the 
Soviet repudiation French bondholders could rationally expect to get reimbursed (or 
partially reimbursed) by a series of actors. Indeed, bondholders’ expectations in the 
case of the Russian repudiation included either an intervention of the French 
government (which had already happened in a recent past
2) to bailout the Russian 
government and insure the debt service or other different scenarios. Among the 
plausible scenarios one may consider the following ones:  
 
1)  A French bailout. This was highly credible since the French government 
actually bailed out part of the bonds and discussions were held in both 
chambers up till the middle of the 1920’s. 
 
2)  Countries created on the ruins of the Russian empire, such as Poland or the 
Baltic States were according to international law, responsible for part of the 
debt and could have reimbursed part of debt. At some point in time, Ukraine, 
Poland, the Baltic States and several minor Caucasian states recognized their 
responsibility for part of the debt. 
 
3)  Following the revolution several armies (White armies) loyal to the Tsar 
attempted to oust the Bolsheviks. If the Bolsheviks were overthrown, a new 
Russian government would probably reimburse the debt. This was indeed 
stated by the successive rulers of the White Armies. 
 
4)  The Bolsheviks could come back on their decision and reimburse the Tsarist 
debts to regain access to the international capital markets. The Bolsheviks 
suggested reimbursing the debts on numerous occasions during the 1920’s. 
 
                                                 
2 Following their repudiation by Juarez, the French government had reimbursed 50% of the Mexican 
bonds issued by Maximilian. This measure only concerned French citizens and was made because of 
the high profile the French government had had when these bonds were floated.   15
5)  Eventually, a clause included in the Versailles Treaty allowed Russia to ask 
war reparations from Germany and French investors hoped to get reimbursed 
in an indirect way (by Germany). This was already mentioned before the peace 
negotiations (Keynes, 1971) and closely followed by French bondholders 
(Landon-Lane, Oosterlinck, 2006). 
 
Hence, the price of each Russian bond, taking into account the presence of 5 potential 
payers could be written as follows: 
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with  i p , i = 1, 2, …, 5 the probability of each potential payer taking over the debt 
service. 
 
As pointed out previously, for each future cash flow there is a relationship 
between the various repayment probabilities. Indeed, the repayment by one party is 
conditional on the default of another. For example, the French government was 
unlikely to bailout the bondholders if the White Armies successfully reimbursed them. 
Thus, whenever the likelihood that one payer would reimburse the debt increased, 
probabilities of repayment by other parties were affected.  
In order to determine the relative importance of each of these elements one 
may want to see how Russian bond prices reacted following the repudiation and how 
this reaction compares to a more traditional case of default. In order to do so, the 
following section tracks an index of Russian bonds following the repudiation and of 
Romanian bonds which defaulted at the beginning of the 1930's. 
   16
4. Data and empirical evidence 
Our database includes prices of two categories of bonds traded on the Paris 
Stock Exchange: Russian bonds repudiated in February 1918 and Romanian bonds 
defaulting in February 1933. 
Ideally, the empirical comparison of repudiation and default should be 
conducted on the same issuer, the same time window and the same market in order to 
eliminate potential country or time period biases. Since the repudiation lasted for 
almost 80 years, no historical example matches this requirement. In order to limit the 
potential bias resulting from the time and country difference, the sample uses very 
similar bonds. In our analysis, we focus on bonds traded on the same market: the Paris 
Stock Exchange, where both governments issued significant parts of their public 
debts. The French market concentrated the major part of the Russian securities, i.e. 
between 40 and 45% of the sovereign Russian debt at the beginning of the XXth 
century, totalizing a nominal amount of 11.72 billions in 1914
3. In the same way, 
during the 1930ties, France became Romania’s major creditor, one third of the total 
Romanian public debt – domestic and foreign – i.e. approximately 1.02 billion French 
francs, being subscribed by French investors.  
       Bonds from both countries exhibit very similar features. Both have gold standard 
parity, explicit for the Romanian bonds and implicit for the Russian ones
4. 
Geographically close, Russia and Romania had both a strong sentimental link with the 
French public. Furthermore, both issues were made with the blessing of the French 
government, very sensitive to their important strategic and geopolitical implications. 
Russian investments were fascinating French investors since the 19
th century whereas 
Romania and France always claimed their common Latin roots. Eventually, the time 
span between the Russian repudiation and the Romanian default is rather small and 
each of these episodes follows a major extreme event, namely WWI and the great 
depression.  
          In the Russian repudiation and the Romanian default, the main difference is the 
existence of different bailout scenarios. In the Russian case, several potential payers 
                                                 
3 The Russian section represented more than one third of the foreign securities quoted on the Paris 
Stock market and almost 4.5% of the French wealth (Girault (1973)). 
4 This particular feature was deemed very important by the French investors, in both cases mainly 
individuals.   17
could be expected to at least partially repay the debt whereas in the Romanian case, 
investors’ only hopes had to rest on the Romanian government
5. 
Our empirical analysis is conducted on the weekly bond prices that were 
collected from the Cours Authentiques des Agents de Change, over a two-year 
window centred on the event date, i.e. the repudiation date - hence stretching from 
February 8, 1916 to February 8, 1920 for Russia – and the default date - hence 
stretching from February 18, 1931 to February 18, 1935 for Romania. For each 
country a bond index was constructed.  
The impact of the presence of multiple payers is analyzed through the price 
evolution of an index composed of two bonds: the Russian sovereign loans 5% 1906 
and 4% 1909. The final use of the principals was to cover general Treasury expenses 
for the first loan and pay back 5% 1904 Treasury bills and extraordinary budget 
expenses in 1909 for the second loan. These two loans were quoted on the 
international financial markets; the first one in Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels, London 
and Vienna and the second one in Paris, Amsterdam and London. Both bonds were 
actively traded with issues amounting respectively to 2.250 billions and to 1.4 billions 
French francs. Most of these bonds were traded in Paris
6 but as the loans were 
redeemable in different foreign currencies, parities were fixed at issue (and identical 
for both bonds). 
The Romanian bond index is composed by either new issues or ancient issues 
newly converted and unified. Most of the time, these bonds were considered as first 
rank debt and provided special guaranties such as the product of some specific public 
taxes, revenues or government monopolies. The most important loans, both in terms 
of principal and liquidity on the Paris Stock Exchange, were the 4% 1922 Treasury 
bills consolidation loan and the two monetary stabilization and development loans 7% 
1929 and 7.5% 1931 (both issued by the Autonomous Monopolies House of the 
Kingdom of Romania)
7. These three loans along with the two unified consoles 4% 
and 5% 1929 – issued following the Paris agreement of 1928 concerning former debt 
                                                 
5 For a detailed description of the Russian repudiation and Romanian default see Landon-Lane and 
Oosterlinck (2006), Oosterlinck and Ureche-Rangau (2005) and Ureche-Rangau (2003). 
6 For the first loan, serial numbers help identifying the market on which the loan is traded. As stated by 
Freymond (1995), 72% of the 1906 loan and 74% of the 1909 loan are traded in France. 
7 These three loans represented 84.53% of the total Romanian debt issues and conversions during the 
Interwar period.   18
unification – were the traded bonds in default in 1933. The maturity of these loans 
ranged from 30 to 41 years. 
The two following figures show the evolution of the two bonds indices. Figure 
1 depicts the evolution of the index represented by the two Russian bonds over the 
1916-1920 period along with the major events that could explain its variations. Figure 
2 presents the evolution of the Romanian bond index from 1931 to 1935 and the most 




The empirical comparison of the two bond indices is provided in Table 1 and 
Table 2. Several elements show that the repudiated Russian bonds actually fared 
better than the Romanian bonds. 
First of all, the mean of the Russian index is significantly higher than the mean 
of the Romanian index (see Table 1). On the other hand, the volatility is higher for the 
Romanian bonds. The maximum and minimum values of the Russian index are 
superior to those of the Romanian index; for the minimum, the Russian one is twice as 
large as the Romanian one. The return series for the Russian bonds are much higher 
than for the Romanian ones. The mean of the Romanian bond returns is the only one 
being statistically negative. These results indeed stress the fact that Russian bonds 
show a better risk-return trade-off with respect to Romanian ones, i.e. they are 




Table 2, which provides descriptive statistics for both the Russian and Romanian 
indices after the repudiation and default, confirms these results. 
The same conclusions hold whether one considers the whole period or only the 
two years following the event. Noteworthy, the Romanian index reaches its maximum   19
value on the reference day. In other words, the prices are following a continuous 
downward trend as soon as the default is announced. On the contrary, the Russian 
index is higher than the reference level at several dates during the studied time period 
and remains at these high levels.  
Intuitively, Romanian bond prices, accompanied by a promise of pay back 
negotiated in the different debt agreements and by the payment of a variable part of 
the coupon, should remain higher than Russian bond market prices. Moreover, the 
comparison of the financial characteristics of the two categories of loans is always in 




  The theoretical framework introduced in the previous section explains these 
counterintuitive results. Generally speaking, the Romanian default is a standard one-
payer case. Once the default was declared, negotiations started and opened the door to 
a series of settlements fixing the amount of each future cash flow. In a systematic 
way, the maximum amount paid by the Romanian government to its bondholders was 
represented by the minimum percentages of coupon payments stipulated by the debt 
agreements, even though each agreement stipulated a “normal” debt service 
immediately following its maturity. Cash flows effectively paid were always revised 
downward.  
  The theoretical framework introduced in the previous section allows us to 
compute the implicit risk neutral default probabilities out of the recorded market 
prices of the Romanian bonds. Their evolution experiences a continuous increase, 




Unlike in the Romanian case, there is no way to directly compute the various 
probabilities for the Russian index. Indeed, there are five potential payers associated   20
to five possible financial outcomes as shown in equations (11). Even though there is 
no way to determine the exact probabilities, it is possible to suggest figures for each 
of them at some points in time.  
Indeed, if one ignores discounting and considers each individual probability as 
being the probability to get a 100% reimbursement either by the debtor, i.e. the 
Soviet
8, or by another payer, then the upper bound of the Russian bond price may be 
estimated as follows: 
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with pWhi the probability of a bailout by the White Armies, pSEC, the probability of 
reimbursement by a seceding country, pFran, the probability of a French bailout and 
pGer, the probability of a German bailout. 
Even if one was highly optimistic, pSov (the probability of a Soviet 
reimbursement), as well as pWhi, were probably very small during most of the studied 
period. Indeed, even if there had been a desire to repay the debts, the state of the 
Russian economy was such that repayment would have happened only in a very 
distant future. At best one may consider pSov to be equal to 1% and pWhi to 5%. 
Regarding the repayment by Germany, hopes were probably also limited: Germany 
would soon default on its foreign loans and the probability of repayment of the 
Russian debts probably never exceeded 1%. On the other hand, seceding countries 
agreed to recognize their responsibility for part of the Russian debts. According to 
Delaisi (1930), Poland, Romania, the Baltic States agreed to recognize, in the 1920’s, 
25% of the former Russian debt. pSec may thus be estimated to be close to 25%. 
Eventually, the French government had previously bailed out its citizens after 
repudiation. Following the repudiation of bonds issued by Maximilian in Mexico, the 
French government agreed to bail out its nationals to the extent of approximately 50% 
of the invested amounts when the new regime ruled by Juarez repudiated these bonds 
in 1867. The French intervention was at the time motivated by the high profile it had 
                                                 
8 This may be viewed as an aggregate probability, in other words if the Soviets may be expected to 
repay on average 5% of par value then we consider that there is a 5% probability that a 100% will be 
repaid.   21
shown when these bonds were floated on the Paris bourse. It is therefore rational to 
consider pFran equal to 50%
9. 
If one replaces these probabilities in equation (12), one finds that the upper 
boundary for the bond price, i.e. a potential recovery value, is 65.08% of par value, a 
very close match to the observed maximum price in terms of par value (see Landon-
Lane Oosterlinck, 2006). 
In a sense, equation (12) implies that each future expected cash flows could be 
viewed, on the Russian bond case, as a portfolio of five bonds with a negative 
correlation. As stated by traditional portfolio theory, a portfolio is always 
characterized by a better risk-return trade off than individual assets, the diversification 
process contributing to increase expected returns and decrease risk/volatility. As such, 
a Russian repudiated bond, viewed as a portfolio of different potential cash flows 
coming from different potential payers, in which risks compensate each other, 





When bondholders hope to get bailed out, they usually consider only one 
potential candidate to bail them out. In very extreme and seldom occurring cases, 
several agents may be viewed as potential rescuers. This is often the case when 
country break up. In this case, successor states are usually assigned part of the debts. 
The break up does not necessarily concern an empire. One may indeed consider the 
potential fate of the Belgian or Canadian debts if Flanders or Quebec managed to 
secede. Another prime situation for the existence of multiple potential payers is 
repudiations, i.e. the non recognition of the legal character of the debt. Repudiations 
                                                 
9 This hypothesis also goes in the line with French Senator De Villaine’s proposal, on October 20, 
1922. Arguing the responsibility of the French government and the French banking system for 
intensively supporting Russian bonds subscription and providing wrong information on their credit 
quality, Senator De Villaine proposes that bondholders’ reimbursement should account for 50% of the 
nominal value, equally split among the government and the banks involved. Hence, we could even 
consider a 6
th potential payer for the Russian debt, namely the French banks. 
10 The fact that our empirical evidence is provided on bond indices instead of individual bonds 
strengthens even more our conclusions. As indices are already diversified portfolios and the Romanian 
one contains even more bonds than the Russian one, at the level of an individual bond, the price and 
volatility differences in favour of the Russian bonds is even higher. Hence, the implicit diversification 
mechanism embedded in each Russian bond has indeed a significant impact on prices and volatilities.   22
usually follow extreme political changes. By refusing to respect the debt issued by the 
former regime, the new authorities stress its predecessor’s illegal or odious nature. In 
this case, potential payers often include the opponents of the “repudiating” regime, 
but may also include IFI’s or countries where the bonds were first issued. 
In the case analyzed here, the difference between repudiated bonds and bonds 
in default may be explained by a simple “implicit” diversification mechanism. When 
multiple potential payers exist, bondholders must consider the conditional probability 
of being repaid. In a sense, bondholders can view their bonds as a portfolio consisting 
of as many bonds as potential payers. These bonds however have a negative 
correlation since if one payer reimburses the bond others are unlikely to do so. This 
approach explains the relative high value of the repudiated bonds as well as their 
lower volatility when compared to the bonds in default. 
Our results also show that the debate on the role of institutional interventions, 
especially operated by the IMF, during financial crisis caused by sovereigns stopping 
their debt service, is far from being closed. These interventions indeed may induce 
some moral hazard both in debtor and creditor attitude towards risk but they also may 
allow a certain diversification of risk sources that maintains bond prices at a higher 
level than sovereign bonds with a single potential payer.  
This comparison of repudiated and defaulted bonds opens a more general 
question regarding the way financial markets perceive different events. Looking at our 
results, one could then even wonder if, at the end, a political revolution is not 
considered by financial markets as more probable to be reversed than an economic 
crisis. One can indeed imagine that revolutions, state blows or political regime 
changes can be very sudden, whereas rebuilding up a country’s economy generally 
asks for a longer time. 
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Table 3: Financial features of the two bond series 
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11 Basis 100 on the event date. 
12 ANPFVM (Association Nationale des Porteurs Français de Valeurs Mobilières).   28  29
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